The Problem of Omniscience and Surprise

Atheism, in its various forms, often relies on criticisms of religious concepts, including the idea of an all-knowing, all-powerful deity. One such criticism is the apparent contradiction between omniscience and the capacity for genuine surprise or regret. In this section, we’ll explore this challenge and demonstrate why it poses a significant problem for atheism.

The Atheist’s Objection

Prominent atheist thinkers, such as Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens, have argued that an all-knowing being cannot be surprised or experience regret because it would imply a lack of knowledge about the event in question. This, they claim, undermines the concept of omniscience.

As Dawkins puts it:

“Omniscience and omnipotence are mutually incompatible. If God is omniscient, he must already know how every human being will react to every conceivable situation. That means that he can’t change his mind about anything, which means he’s not omnipotent.” [(1)]

The Inconsistency of Omniscience and Surprise

At first glance, the atheist’s objection appears convincing. If an all-knowing being knows everything that will occur, it’s difficult to see how it could be surprised or experience regret when those events unfold. After all, surprise and regret imply a certain level of unpredictability or unforeseen consequences.

However, this criticism relies on a narrow understanding of omniscience and neglects the nuances of divine knowledge. The problem lies in assuming that omniscience is equivalent to a static, deterministic view of time. In reality, an all-knowing being’s perspective on time might be fundamentally different from ours.

The Nature of Divine Knowledge

Philosophers have long grappled with the nature of divine knowledge, and various solutions have been proposed to address this challenge. One such approach is the concept of middle knowledge, developed by 16th-century theologian Luis de Molina.

Middle knowledge posits that God’s omniscience includes not only knowledge of what will occur but also knowledge of what could have occurred under different circumstances. This perspective allows for a more dynamic understanding of time, where possibilities and contingencies are taken into account.

In this framework, an all-knowing being can still experience surprise or regret without compromising its omniscience. The surprise or regret would stem from the actualization of certain possibilities rather than a lack of knowledge about those possibilities.

Reconciling Omniscience with Human Freedom

Another crucial aspect to consider is the relationship between divine knowledge and human freedom. If an all-knowing being knows every detail of human actions, does that imply a deterministic universe where free will is an illusion?

Not necessarily. The concept of compatibilism offers a solution, suggesting that human freedom is compatible with divine foreknowledge. According to this view, God’s knowledge of future events does not cause those events but rather is a consequence of his omniscience.

In this context, an all-knowing being can still experience surprise or regret at the choices humans make, even if it knew they would occur. The surprise or regret would arise from the complexity and unpredictability of human decisions, rather than a lack of knowledge about those decisions.

Addressing Counterarguments

Atheists might respond that middle knowledge and compatibilism are ad hoc solutions designed to salvage the concept of an all-knowing being. They might argue that these approaches introduce unnecessary complexities and undermine the simplicity of atheism.

However, it’s essential to recognize that philosophical concepts like omniscience and free will are inherently complex and multifaceted. The critiques leveled by atheists often rely on oversimplifications or misunderstandings of these concepts.

Conclusion

The apparent contradiction between omniscience and surprise/regret is a challenge that has been addressed through various philosophical solutions, including middle knowledge and compatibilism. These approaches demonstrate that an all-knowing being can still experience genuine surprise or regret without compromising its omniscience.

Atheists who argue against the possibility of an all-knowing being must engage with these nuanced perspectives and provide more robust counterarguments. Until then, the critique of omniscience and surprise remains a flawed objection to religious concepts.

References

[(1)] Dawkins, R. (2006). The God Delusion. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

By engaging with prominent atheist thinkers and their ideas, we’ve demonstrated that atheism’s critiques of religious concepts are often based on oversimplifications or misunderstandings. In the next section, we’ll explore another challenge to atheism: the problem of morality and objective values.