Title: The Compatibility of Philosophical Arguments for Moral Relativism with Theistic Morality

Introduction

Moral relativism, the idea that what is considered morally right or wrong varies across different cultures and societies, has long been a topic of debate in philosophy. This perspective challenges the notion of universal moral truths by asserting that moral values are socially constructed rather than derived from objective standards (Krausz & Rosati, 2006). Theistic morality, on the other hand, posits that moral values are grounded in divine commands or the nature of God, and thus are universally binding. This article examines whether philosophical arguments for moral relativism undermine theistic morality.

Background: Moral Relativism and Theistic Morality

Moral relativism maintains that there are no absolute moral truths, only cultural norms and practices. Proponents argue that moral diversity among cultures demonstrates that morality is not based on objective standards but rather on social conventions (Krausz & Rosati, 2006). In contrast, theistic morality posits that moral values have their source in God’s commands or divine nature. This view asserts that certain moral principles are universally valid because they reflect God’s unchanging character and will.

Statement of the Problem

The debate between moral relativism and theistic morality raises several key questions:

  • Is it possible for moral values to be both culturally relative and grounded in objective divine standards?
  • If moral relativism is true, does this necessarily undermine the validity of theistic moral claims?
  • Can a coherent account of morality be provided that incorporates elements of both moral relativism and theistic morality?

Literature Review

This section presents an overview of existing research on moral relativism and theistic morality, with a focus on examining how these perspectives might interact.

Philosophical Arguments for Moral Relativism

Moral relativists argue that there are no objective moral truths because moral values are entirely dependent on cultural norms. They contend that this position is supported by several philosophical arguments:

  1. The Argument from Cultural Diversity: Proponents of moral relativism point to the wide range of moral beliefs and practices across different societies as evidence that morality is not based on universal principles (Krausz & Rosati, 2006). For example, some cultures endorse polygamy while others condemn it; this variation suggests that moral values are contingent upon cultural context.

  2. The Argument from Ethical Disagreement: Moral relativists argue that persistent disagreement over moral issues within and between societies demonstrates the lack of objective moral truths (Krausz & Rosati, 2006). If there were such truths, they claim, we should expect greater consensus on moral questions than is actually observed.

  3. The Argument from Relativistic Language: Some philosophers contend that our use of moral language supports a relativistic interpretation of morality. They argue that statements like “X is wrong” are best understood as expressing approval or disapproval relative to particular social norms rather than making claims about objective facts (Krausz & Rosati, 2006).

Philosophical Arguments for Theistic Morality

Theists offer various philosophical arguments in support of their belief in objective moral values grounded in divine commands or nature:

  1. The Argument from Moral Intuition: Some theists argue that humans have an innate sense of right and wrong, which suggests the existence of universal moral principles (Pojman & Reiker, 2005). They contend that this intuition can be best explained by positing a God who has imbued human beings with knowledge of objective moral truths.

  2. The Argument from Moral Order: Proponents of theistic morality argue that the presence of moral order in the universe points to the existence of a divine lawgiver (Pojman & Reiker, 2005). They maintain that this order cannot be adequately explained by natural processes alone but requires an intelligent source.

  3. The Argument from Moral Responsibility: Some theists contend that our ability to make genuinely free and morally significant choices presupposes the existence of objective moral values (Pojman & Reiker, 2005). In their view, this capacity for moral agency can only be accounted for if there are real moral standards against which we can assess our actions.

Discussion: Compatibility of Moral Relativism with Theistic Morality

The question at hand is whether philosophical arguments for moral relativism undermine theistic morality. This section will analyze three possible ways in which these perspectives might interact:

  1. Incompatibility: One possibility is that moral relativism and theistic morality are fundamentally incompatible, such that accepting one view necessarily entails rejecting the other. On this view, if moral values are entirely dependent on cultural norms, as relativists claim, then there can be no objective divine standards of right and wrong.

Counterarguments to Incompatibility:

  • Cultural Relativism vs. Moral Relativism: It is important to distinguish between cultural relativism (the belief that moral values vary across cultures) and moral relativism (the denial of any objective moral truths). While cultural relativism may pose challenges for theistic morality, it does not necessarily entail full-blown moral relativism.
  • Divine Command Theory: Some versions of theistic morality, such as divine command theory, hold that moral values are grounded in God’s will rather than His nature (Pojman & Reiker, 2005). If this is true, then it could be possible for different cultures to receive distinct sets of divine commands without undermining the objectivity of their respective moral systems.
  1. Synthesis: Another possibility is that elements of both moral relativism and theistic morality can be synthesized into a coherent account of morality. For instance, one might argue that God has created human beings with diverse cultural backgrounds in order to foster moral pluralism, which enriches our understanding of what it means to live a good life.

Counterarguments to Synthesis:

  • Moral Pluralism vs. Moral Relativism: While acknowledging the value of moral diversity need not commit us to relativism, it does raise questions about how we ought to adjudicate between conflicting moral claims within and between cultures.
  • The Problem of Divine Arbitrariness: If God’s will is the sole source of moral value, as some divine command theorists maintain, then this raises concerns about whether morality would be arbitrary if God had chosen differently (Pojman & Reiker, 2005).
  1. Reconciliation: A third possibility is that apparent conflicts between moral relativism and theistic morality can ultimately be reconciled through a deeper understanding of each perspective. For example, one might argue that what appears to be cultural variation in moral values is actually due to differing interpretations or applications of universally binding divine principles.

Counterarguments to Reconciliation:

  • Interpretive Disagreements: Even if there are objective divine standards, it remains an empirical question whether different cultures consistently arrive at correct interpretations of these standards.
  • Moral Imperialism: Efforts to reconcile diverse cultural practices with theistic morality may risk imposing one culture’s understanding of God and morality onto others, raising concerns about moral imperialism (Krausz & Rosati, 2006).

Conclusion

In conclusion, this article has explored whether philosophical arguments for moral relativism undermine theistic morality. While there are potential sources of tension between these two perspectives, it is not clear that they must be viewed as fundamentally incompatible. Future research should continue to investigate possible avenues for synthesis or reconciliation while remaining attentive to the complexities and nuances involved in each approach.

References

Krausz, M., & Rosati, C. (Eds.). (2006). The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press.

Pojman, L. P., & Reiker, P. (2005). Philosophy: Discovering the Big Ideas: A Comprehensive Introduction to Over 100 Key Thinkers from Plato to Derrida. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.